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No. 78-647
MARCHIORO,
et al.

Appe.;,J from Wash. S .Ct.
(Doii{ver, for himself
·tid 4 others; Horowitz,
dissenting for himself
and 2 others; Stafford,
dissenting separately)
State/Civil

-v.

CHANEY,

et al.
-

1.

SUMMARY:

Timely

Appellants challenge a Washington

statute that prescribes that "[t]he state conunittee of

-

each majo:_ political party shall consist of one com.....

::--

mitteeman and one conunitteewoman from each county elected
by the county conunittee at its organization meeting,"
RCW 29.42o020, on the ground that, by limiting the number

-------

of committeepersons per county, the statute operates to
abridge appellants' freedom of association.
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2.

FACTS & DECISION BELOW: ' The Washington

State Democratic Party is comprised of several related
bodies.

The~tate

Party Convention is the supreme au-

thority; it meets every two years, has plenary authority
over party organization and policies, and elects delegates
to the National Democratic Party meetings.

Between state

conventions, the Democratic State Committee is the statewide governing body.

It meets four times a year.

Ap-

pellants and appellees agree that the State Committee makes
intraparty rules governing the statewide operations of the
party as a political organization between conventions and

, --

that it raises and distributes some money to party candidates.
As far as is relevant here, the State Committee does not perform direct electoral functions.

See Petn. 4 n. 4.

RCW 29.42.020, quoted above, requires state committees
the state's major parties to be
tatives from each of the

state's ~ 39

composed~f

counties.

two represenPursuant to this

formula, the three most populous counties -- with more than
50% of the state's population

elect only 8% of the members

of the State Committee, while 30 counties -- with only 23% of
the population -- elect 77%.

Thus a minority of party members

in rural counties exercise principal control over the Washington
Democratic Party between conventionso
In 1976, the State Democratic Convention adopted a
charter provision stipulating that the State Committee shall be
composed of two representatives elected from each of the state's

- 3 -

39 counties and of one representat'ive elected from each
of the state's 49 legislative districts.

The result would

be partly to even out the voting power of the counties'
respective residents and, relatedly, to give residents of
legislative districts a greater voice than they enjoyed under
a system of county-wide elections.
At the next meeting of the State Committee, the
Committee refused to seat the newly elected district
representatives, including four of appellants, on -the ground
that RCW 29.42.020 forbade participation of more than two
representatives from each county.

,r

Those appellants and four

others -- including three party chairpersons for the three most
populous counties in Washington and a county representative on
the State Committee -- brought suit in state court against the
State Committee and its chairman for a declaratory judgment.
They argued that the state statute as applied to bar implementation of the Convention's charter provision and to bar four of
the appellants from serving as committeepersons, impermissibly
burdened appellants' rights of freedom of association.
challenge, not pertinent here, . was also pressed.

Another

The state was

served with a copy of the complaint but did not intervene or
appear as amicus to defend the statute.

The trial court granted

summary judgment for appellants, reasoning that the "statute
purports to control the inner workings of a voluntary political
association" without a compelling state interest.
./"

Petn. App. B-3 .
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The Supreme Court of Washin'g ton reversed,
holding that

'~CW

29.42.020 is not a substantial burden

on plaintiffs' right of free association for political
purposes."
real inquiry

Petn. App. A-15.
wa~

The court observed that the

whether the state law substantially im-

peded appellants' efforts to achieve the general stated
objectives of the Democratic Party, reproduced in appendix
hereto.

The court found no such burden.

The court expressed

its view that this dispute was in actuality a factional dispute within the Democratic Party, which was best resolved by
"intraparty politicking."

Petn. App. A-lSo

Finally, the court

acknowledged that charter provisions adopted by the Democratic
State Convention are generally binding on the State Committee
but held that the provision involved herein was not presumably
because it was prohibited by a valid state law, namely,
RCW 29.42.020.
The four dissenting

justic~s

concluded that the state

statute did impose a substantial burden on appellants' First
Amendment rights and that a compelling state interest had not
been adduced to substantiate the law.

There was a burden even

accepting the majority's own analytical framework because among
the Democratic Party's stated objectives was the aim to "[administer the party organization in accordance with rules and standards
which will facilitate achieving the goals of the party."
Appo A-23.

Petn.

- 5 -

3.

CONTENTIONS:

Appellants contend that the

state law is unconstitutional in that it bars several of
them from serving in their elected positions on the State
Committee, and it nullifies each appellant's right as a
party member to elect and be represented by a State Committee
composed as directed by the State Party Conventiono
Appellants purport to find support in this Court's
decision in Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975)o

There the

Court sustained a challenge to a state injunction forbidding
59 persons from serving as party-approved delegates to the
Democratic National Convention issued because they had not
been selected in accordance with state lawo

The injunction was

held to constitute an insufficiently justified burden on the
First Amendment rights of the delegates and the party generally.
The Court reached the same conclusion with respect to an injunction forbidding the delegates from participating in a postconvention caucus to select Illinois representatives to the
Democratic National Committeeo
Appellants also rely on strong language in Ripon
Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567 (CA DC 1975)
(~bane)

cert denied, 424 UoS. 933 (1976), recognizing a "right

not only to form political associations but to organize and direct them in the way that will make them most effective."
at 585.

525 F.2d

Additional support is found in Fahey v. Darigan, 405

F. Supp. 1386 (Do R.I. 1975), in which the court struck down a
state statute mandating the size of political party ward committees

- 6 '

Appellants point out as well that the Washington
S.Ct. gave inadequate consideration to a particular article
of the party's charter listing "Basic Principles," two of
which are clearly burdened by the state statute at issue.
These principles include the propositions that all party
members shall enjoy equal rights and opportunities in all
proceedings of the party at all levels and that, in all
elections in which party policy is determined or party officials elected, appropriate procedures shall provide for full
and equal participation and fair, ·proportional representation.
Appellees attempt to downplay the policymaking role
of the State Committee.

They allege, too, that the amounts

of money raised and distributed have been small and have gone
to the administration of the State Committee, payment of debts
and distribution to Democratic Party candidates nominated to
run for office.

Appellees also suggest that appellants have not

been seated in part because not all of the district representatives have been elected, and it has been the consistent position
of the State Committee not to seat any until all have been chosen.
Appellees place some reliance on a provision of the party's
charter that says when any part of the charter is in conflict
with state statutes the latter will control.
Appellees argue that the seminal freedom-of-association
cases such as NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.So 449 (1958), dealt with

L

state interference with the freedom of individuals to form groups,
not state regulation of the internal structure of the groups that
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(

resulted.

Appellees distinguish c'o usins on the ground

that it involved a national convention and the nomination
of national candidates.

The issue here concerns state

regulation of part of a state political party.

Cousins

dealt, moreover, with the advancement of ideas and the
selection of candidates, functions supposedly not involved
in the instant case.
Appellees observe that Ripon Society simply held
that the Equal Protection Clause did not mandate a one-person
one-vote formula for delegates to the 1976 National Republican
Convention, and thus is inapposite here on two counts:

the

constitutional issue involved was different and a national

*I

convention figured prominently in the situation there considered.The language in Ripon Society supporting appellants' position is,
in appellees' view, overbroad dictum.

Appellees do not attempt

to distinguish Fahey, but contend that it was wrongly decided.
Finally, appellees contend .that the state statute is
justified as a measure designed to regularize the election process.
The statute ensures that each major political party shall have an
administrative body between state conventions, thus preserving the
stability and integrity of the electoral process.

Appellees point

to the statutes of numerous states that have undertaken to regulate
the composition of political party state committees.

*I

- Actually, the langua?e on which appellants rely was an important
part of the Ripon court s analysis in regard to whether a party
should be constitutionally compelled to adopt a certain operational
mode.

- 8 -
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In reply, appellants generally attack appellees'
attempt to establish that freedom of association does not
encompass a state political party's internal

~overnance.

They contend that even if the state has a compelling interest
in maintaining stability in the electoral process, the state
has not chosen the least restrictive means here.

A require-

ment that there be a state committee with at least two persons
per county would serve the interest of stability and any interest
in ensuring that all areas of the state are represented.

Six of

the 30 states noted by appellees permit the state party itself
to determine the composition of state committees.

Several of

these states use the "minimum but no maximum" approach.

Twelve

other states mandate a formula based on one-person one-vote
principles (which everyone concedes is not constitutionally
compelled under the circumstances of this case), which involves
the substantial interest in ensuring equal representation.

Twelve

other states have laws similar to .W ashington's, which in appellants ·
view makes this case even more significant.
4.

DISCUSS ION:

There is some question in this case

J-r

whether the decision below rests on a nonconstitutional ground

1

In the final section of its opinion, the court ruled that the
charter provision at issue here is not binding on the State
Committee, though the charter generally does govern the affairs
of that committee.

The dissenters pointed out that the majority's

analysis rests on the general state-law principle that the charter
governs absent the intervention of applicable statutory provisions,

- 9 and on the further assumption that the statute involved here
is valid.

The majority, of course, thought that the statute

was valid and the dissenters disagreed.

Thus, the ultimate

question appears to be the constitutional one of the validity
of RCW 29.42.020 insofar as it interferes with the internal
governance of the party.
As noted above, appellees point out that the charter
itself provides that applicable state laws shall control over
parts of the charter "found to be in conflict with such statutes."
Motion to Affirm at 5 n. 2.

The ·court below did not explicitly

rely on this provision, however.

Its holding of the nonbinding

effect of the charter provision in dispute seems best explained
by the theory of the dissenters, just discussed.

Thus, it would

appear that the only issue resolved by the court below and presented in this appeal is whether RCW 29.42.020 might constitutionally bar the individual appellants' assumption of office and
generally frustrate the implementation of the specific and recently
enacted charter provision expanding the number of committee seats.
That issue does not seem insubstantial.

Though there is

some dispute about just how important the State Committee really
is, and though it concededly is less important than a national
nominating convention in relation to the effective implementation
of the Democratic Party's political objectives, the Committee does
seem to have a substantial role in the ongoing maintenance of the
state party organization.

Indeed, that is the premise of the

state's efforts to regulate the committee's internal operation,

- 10 according to appellees • . To the extent that the Washington
statute forces uneven representation, then, it would appear
to have a substantial effect on the ability of party members
to participate effectively in a significant aspect of party
activity as well as a clear direct effect on persons elected
under the charter provision designed to ensure fairer representation.

At least some inquiry into the magnitude and

character of the state's interest would seem to be warranted.
But the court below did not even reach that stage, being of the
view that there was no cognizable burden on constitutional rights
to begin with.

Were that inquiry conducted, appellants' least-

restrictive-alternative analysis might well prevail.
As an initial matter, it might prove useful to call
for the views of the State of Washington on these issues.
Evidently, the state has remained silent thus far.
CFR Washington.

There is a motion to affirm.
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APPENDIX

The purpose and objectives of the. Democratic Party as
listed by the charter are:
_________.
1. Adopt and promote statements of policy to serve as
standards for Democratic elected officials and goals for
the people of the state.
2. Nominate and assist in the election of Democratic
candidates at all levels who support the goals of the·
party.
·
·
3. Administer the party organization in accordance with
rules and standards which will facilitate achieving the
goals of the party.
4. Establish standards and rules of procedure to afford
all members of the Democratic Party full, timely and
equal . opportunities to participate in decisions con·
cerning the selection of candidates, the formulation of
policy, and the conduct of other party affairs without
discrimination on the basis of sex, race, age (except
where state and federal law precludes participation),
religion, economic status or ethnic origin.
5. Promote fair campaign practices and fair adjudication
of disputes.
6. Raise and disburse monies needed for the continuing
operation of the Party.
7. \Vork with elected Democratic public officials at all
levels to achieve the goals of the Democ:atic Party.
8. Encourage and support codes of political ethics governing ali public officials in the conduct of their offices.
9. Encourage voter registration and voting.
Charter of the Democratic Party· of \V ashington, art. 2,
Purposes and Objectives (June 12, 1976).
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v. Chaney

is an appeal from a decision of
of Washington that sustains the validity
of state code S 29.42.020, providing:
"The state committee of each major political
party shall consist of one committeeman and
one committeewoman from each county elected
by the county committee at its organization
meeting."

The State of Washington has regulated the
composition of state committees of the major parties
1909.

I believe (though I am not certain) that
here challenged has been on the books since
~,

Nevertheless, in 1976, the Washington State

Democratic Convention adopted a charter provision that,
addition to the two delegates per county, would increase
committee membership by one additional member
the state's forty-nine legislative districts.

--

-

~~<f;.

2.

Appellants in this case are persons who were
from legislative districts pursuant to the 1976
change in the democratic charter.

Apparently they have

beP.n allowed to participate as members of the
because of the state statute"'!l· Accordingly, they instituted
this suit • . Appellees include the State Democratic CommitteJ'
Thus, this is a contest between individuals who
have been elected - under the

scheme ~ adopted

by the State

Convention - ;:and the existirig State Democratic
~

The challenge is based on an alleqed First

Amendment denial of associational rights.

The

Supreme Court, 5-4, held that there
burdening of such rights.
1j,.·

···,

Appellees point

state has a

interest in regulating the two major parties, that
done so since 1909, and

tha~ :

the Democratic controlled

legislature of the state has declined to change the
at issue.
I am inclined to think there is no burdening
in any constitutionRl sense.

:.
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The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

I

No. 78-647

Karen Marchioro et al.,
Appellants,
On Appeal from the Supreme Court.
v.
of Washington.
Neale V. Chaney et al.
[May -, 1979]
MR. JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opmwn of the Court.
Since 1927 a Washington statute has required each major ·
political party to have a State Committee consisting of two
persons from each county in the State. 1 The question preRCW 29.--42.020 provides:
"State Committee. The state committee of Pach major political party
shall consist of one committeeman and one committeewoman from each
county elected by the county committee at its organization meeting. It
shall have a chairman and vice-chairman who must be of oppoRite sexes.
This committee shall meet during January of Pach odd-numbered year for
the purpose of organization at a time a.nd plarP de~ignated by a sufficient
notice to all the newly elected state committePmen and committeewomen
by the authorized officers of the rPtiring committee. For the purpose of ·
this section a notice mailed at least one week prior to the date of the meeting shall constitute sufficient notice. At its organizational mPeting it shall
elect its chairman and vice-chairman, and such officers as its bylaws may
provide, and adopt bylaws, rules and regulations. It shall have power to:
"(1) Call conventions at such time and place and under such circumstances and 'for such purposes as the call to convention shall designate.
The manner, number and procedure for selection of state convention delegates shall be subject to the committee's rules and regulations duly ·
adopted;
"(2) Provide for the election of delegates to national conventions;
"(3) Fill vacancies on the ticket for any federal or state office to be ·
voted on by the electors of more than one county;
" ( 4)' IProvide
for •the nomiljlation
of presidential electors; and
.
•
..
1

Bla okmun

..
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sented by this appeal is whether the Washington Supreme
Court correctly held that this statute does not violate the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 2
The powers of the Democratic State Committee are derived
from two sources: the authorizing statute and the Charter of
the Democratic Pa.rty of Washington. The statute gives the
State Committee the power to call conventions, to provide for
the election of delegates to na.tional conventions and for the
nomination of presidential electors, and to fill vacancies on
the party ticket.
The principal activities performed by the State Committee
are authorized by the Charter of the Democratic Party of
Washington. The Charter provides that the State Commit..
tee shall act as the Party's governing body when the Convention is in adjournment. 3 And it gives the State Committee
authority to organize and administer the Party's administrative apparatus, to raise and distribute funds to candidates, to
conduct workshops, to instruct candidates on effective cam"(5) Perform all functions inherent in such an organization.
"Notwithstanding any provision of this 1972 amendatory act, the committee shall not set rules which shall govern the conduct of the actual proceedings at a party state convention."
Between 1909 and 1927 the statute provided for one member to be
elected from each county.
A "major political party" is defined as " ·' a political party of which at
least one nominee for president, vice-president, United States senator, or a
state-wide office received at least five percent of the total vote cast at the
last preceding state general election in an even-numbered year
'"
RCW 29.01.090.
2 The First Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances."
The freedom protected against federal encroachment by the First
Amendment is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to the same protection from infringement by the States. William v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23r
30-31.
8

Charter, Art. IV (G) (1), App. 10 . .

'18-64'1--0PINION
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paign procedures and organization, and generally to further
the Party's objectives of influencing policy and electing its
adherents to public office. 4
Under both Party rules and state law, the State Convention rather than the State Committee, is the governing body
of the Party. The Charter explicitly provides that the Convention is "the highest policy-making authority within the
State Democratic Party" 5 And the State Supreme Court has
unequivocally held that the "State convention of a major
political party is the ultimate repository of State-wide authority. . . . The State Convention is implicitly empowered to
establish the permanent State organization of the party,
crea.te committees, delegate authority, and promulgate, adopt,
ratify, amend, repeal or enforce intra-party State-wide rules
and regulations." 6
In 1976 the State Democratic Convention adopted a Charter amendment directing that the State Committee include
members other than those specified by state statute. ·The
Charter amendment provided that in addition to the two
delegates from each of the State's 39 counties, there should
be one representative elected from each of the State's 49
legislative districts. Pursuant to this Charter amendment
new legislative district representatives were elected to serve
on the State Committee. At the January 1977 meeting
of the State Committee, a motion to seat these newly elected
representatives was ruled out of order, apparently in reliance
on the statutory definition of the composition of the
Committee. 7
4

Charter, Art. IV (0)(1), (2), (5), App. 10-11; Charter, Art. VII

(C) (1), App. 19.

Charter, Art. V (F) .
King County Republican Cent1'al Committee v. Republican State Committee, 79 Wn. 2d 202, 211-212, 484 P. 2d 387, 392 (1971). See also
Ma1·chioro v. Chaney, 90 Wn. 2d 298, 313, 582 P. 2d 487, 496 (1978).
7 An appeal from that ruling was defeated by a vote of 56 to 17. App~
4-5,
i5

6
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Thereafter, members and officers of the State Democratic
Party, including four who had been elected as legislative
district representatives, instituted this action for declaratory
and injunctive relief in the King County Superior Court.
Among their contentions was a claim that the statutory restriction on the composition of the Democratic State Committee violated their rights to freedom of association protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 8
The Superior Court granted appellants' motion for a partial
summary judgment. On appeal, a divided State Supreme
Court reversed that part of the trial court's judgment that invalidated the statutory definition of the central Committee. 0
The state court reasoned that although "substantial burdens"
on the right to associate for political purposes are invalid
unless "'essential to serve a compelling state interest,' " 10
these appellants failed to establish that this statute had
imposed any such burden on their attempts to achieve the
objectives of the Democratic Party. Since this initial burden
had not been met, the court upheld the constitutionality of
the challenged statute.
We noted probable jurisdiction, U. S. - , and now
affirm the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court.
The requirement that political parties form central or
county committees composed of specified representa.tives from
8 Appellants also challenged the requirement of RCW 29.42.020 and .030
that the two persons elected as county delegates be one man and one
woman. Appellants argued that this requirement violates the Washington State Equal Rights Amendment, Wash. Const., Art. XXX. The
Washington Supreme Court rejected the claim, 90 Wn . 2d, at 308, 582 P.
2d, at - . Appellants do not seek review here of the "one man and one
woman" requirements of the statute. Nor do they raise any claim based
on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See n. 16,
infra.
9 Mar-chioro v. Chaney, 90 Wn. 2d 298, 582 P. 2d 487 (1978).
10 !d., at 309, 582 P. 2d, at 493, quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724,

. 129.
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each district is common in the laws of the States. 11 These
laws are part of broader election regulations that recognize
the critical role played by political parties in the process
In 22 States, political parties are required by state law to establish
state central committees composed of an equal number of committee members from each unit of representation.
Sec Cal. Elec. Code§§ 8660, 9160 (Supp. 1978); Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 103.111
(Harrison 1975 & Supp. 1977); Idaho Code § 34.504 (Supp. 1977); Ind.
Code Ann. § 3-1-2-1 (Burns 1972); IowH. Code Ann. § 43.111 (West Supp.
1977); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25.3804 (Supp. 1976); Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 52
§ 1 (Law. Co-op. 1978); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 168.597 (West 1967);
Miss. Code Ann. § 23-1-3 (Supp. 1977); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 115.621 (Vernon
Supp. 1978); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 23.3403 (Supp. 1977); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 293.153 (1975); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 19:5-4 (West 1964); N. D.
Cent. Code § 16-17-11 (1971); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3517.03 (Page
1972); S. C. Code § 7-9-90 (1976); S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 12-5-16
(1975); Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-1304 (Supp. 1977); Tex. Elec. Code Ann.,
tit. 13, § 38 (Vernon Supp. 1978); Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 17, § 730 (1968);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 29.42.020 (Supp. 1976); W. Va. Code § 3-1-9
(Supp. 1978); Wyo. Stat. §§ 22-4-105-110 (1977). Election laws in five
States establish state party central committees in which the number of
committee members from each unit of representation bears a rough relationship to party membership. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-233 (West
1975); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-14-108 (2) (Supp. 1976); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 18:285 (1) (West 1969 & Supp. 1977); Ore. Rev. Stat.§ 248.075 (1977);
Utah Code Ann. § 20-4-2 (1976).
Political parties are required to establish county central committees comprised of an equal number of committee members from each unit of representation by state law in 21 State.
See Cal. Elec. Code §§ 8820--8825, 9320--9325 (West 1977) (limited to
certain counties); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-14-1081 (1) (Supp. 1976); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 103.111 (Harrison 1975 & Supp. 1977); Idaho Code § 34-502
(Supp. 1977); Ind. Code Ann. § 3-1-2-1 (Burns 1972); Kan. Stat. Ann .
§ 25-3802 (1973); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18:285 (9) (Supp. 1978); Md.
Ann. Code, art. 33, § 11-2 (Supp. 1977); Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 52, §§ 2-4,
2-9 (Law. Co-op. 1978); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 168.599 (West 1967 &
Supp. 1978); Miss. Code Ann. § 23-1-3 (Supp. 1977); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 115.607 (Vernon Supp. 1978); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 23-3401, 233402 (Supp. 1977); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 19-5-3 (Supp. 1977); Ohio Rrv.
Code Ann. § 3517.03 (Page 1972); S. C. Code § 7-9-60 (1976); S. D.
11
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of selecting and electing candidates for state and national
office. The State's interest in ensuring that this process is
conducted in a fair and orderly fashion is unquestionably
legitimate; "as a practical matter there must be a substantial
regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and
if some sort of order, rather than chaos. is to accompany the
democratic process." Storer v. Braum, 415 U. S. 724, 730.
That interest is served by a state statute requiring that a
representative central committee be established, aud entrusting that commitee with authority to perform limited functions, such as filling vacancies on the Party ticket, providing
for the nomination of presidential electors and delegates to
national conventions, and calling statewide conventions. Such
functions are directly related to the orderly participation of
the political party in the electoral process.
Appellants have raised no objection to the Committee's
performance of these tasks. 12 Rather, it is the Committee's
Comp. Laws Ann . §§ 12-5-13, 12-5-14 (1975 & Supp. 1977); Trx. Elec.
Code Ann., tit. 13, § 18 (Vrrnon Supp. 1978); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 29.42.0:30 (Supp. 1976); W. Va. Code § 3-1-9 (Supp. 1978); Wis. Stat.
Ann.§ 8.17 (Wrst 1967 & Supp. 1977).
Sre Note, Equal Representation of Party Members on Political Party
Central Committees, 88 YaJe L. J. 167, 168-169, and nn. 5-6 (1978) .
u By appellants' own admission, t.he Committrr's electoral functions are
performed rarely; moreover, when they are performed, they conform with
Lhe one-person, one-vote principle. "Although the state committee on rate
occasions performs certain ballot. acce~s function~, sec RCW 2!1.18.150 and
29.42.020 (filling vacancies on c!"rtain party tickets a11d nominating presidential elector~) and Wal:lh. Const., Art. II, § 15 (selectmg uominees for
certain intPrim legislative positions), whrn it doe~ so it i~ constitutionally
required to comply wit.h the principle of one-per~on, one-vole. Sre, e.g.,
Seergy v. Kings County Republican County Comm., 459 F. 2d 308, 313314 (CA2 1972); Fahey v. Da.rigan, 405 F . Supp. 1386, 1392 (RI 1975) .
The state committee has recognized this and has RtipuhLted to the entry
of an injunction ordering that the state rommittee be :
"enjoined from filling vacancies on the Democratic ticket for any federal
or s1 ate office to be votl'd on by the elector::; of more than one county or
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ather activities-those involving "purely internal party decisions," Brief for Appellants, at 5 n. 11-that concern
appellants and give rise to their constitutional attack on the
statute.
The Committee does play a significant role in internal
party affairs: The appellants' description of its activities
makes this clear :
"Between state conventions, the Democratic State Committee is the statewide party governing body. It meets
at least four times each year, exercises the party's policymaking functions, directs the party's administrative
apparatus, raises and distributes funds to Democratic
candidates, conducts workshops to instruct candidates on
effective campaign procedures and organization, and
seeks generally to further the party's objectives of influencing policy and electiHg its adherents to public
office. Insofar as is relevant here, the state committee
is purely an internal party governing bouy.'' Appellants
Brief, at 4--5.
:rone of these activities, howPver, is required by statute to
be performed by the Committee. 1" With respect to each, the
electing Democratic nominres for interim legislative appointments to
represent multi-county district::; by any method that contravene" the oneperson, one-vote rule. Cunningham v. Washington State Democratic
Comm., Civ. No. C75-901 (WD Wa.;;h., permanent injunction entered
Nov. 28, 1977) .
" As a result of this injunction, RCW 29.42.020-which rc::;ultR in gross
deviations from om•-person, onr-vote--ha:,; bern supPr~Pded msofar as
applied to the state committee when it performs electoral funct10ns." Brief
for Appellants, at. 4 n. 11.
13 ln addition to its enumerated funct.iom:, t.lw Comm1tteP IR authorized
by RCW 29.42.020 to "[p~lerform all function~ inherent in Huch an orgamzatwn. " Sr<' n. 1, supra. The CommittP<''s rolr m mt<'rnal party affair~, howevrr, JS clear!~· not " inherent" in it::; performance of thP limited
electoral function~ authorizPd by !:itatute.
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source of the Committee's authority is tho Charter adopted by
the Democratic Party. 11
In short, all of the "internal party decisions" which appellents claim should not be made by a statutorily composed
Committee arc made not because of anything in the statute,
but because of delegations of authority from the Conve11tion
itself. Nothing in the statuto required the Party to authorize
such decisiomnaking by tho Committee; as far as the statutory scheme is concerned, there is no reason why the Couventiou could not have created a new committee composed
of members of the State Committee and such additional membership as might be desired to perform the political functions
now performed by the State Committee. Tho fact that it
did not choose such an alternative course is hardly the responsibility of the state legislature.
The answer to appellants' claims of a substantial burden
on First Amendment rights, then. turns out to be a simple
one. There can be no cornplaint that the Party's right to
govern itself has been substantially burdened by statute when
the source of the complaint is the Party's own decision to
confer critical authority 011 the State Committee. The
elected legislative representatives who claim that they have
been unable to participate in the intemal policymaking of the
Committee should address their complaint to the Party which
has chosen to entrust those tasks to the Committee, rather
14

Indeed, it IS the Charter provisionR. ratlwr than the Rtalr tatute,
which appellants themselves Cite as authorit~· for tiH:ir desmpt10n of the
Committrr activitirs at issue lwre. Sec Brief for AppcllantH, at 4 nn.
5-10. Thus, it iK Art. IV (G) (1) of the Chartt'r which provides that the
Committee• IS the statewide govrrning body, shall rmse fund~ for candidates, and shall rxerrise the Party's pohrymakiug functiOn~. And It IS
subsection (2) of that :-;amc Artiri<=' which authorize:> thC' Committer to
direct the Party':; admim:;tratJve ap1111ratu~. while ~ub~ertion (5) require8
it to meet at least four hmC'S per ymr. Finally, thr "ource of thr CommJttrc':; autbonty to conduct work~hops for randidatr.s i::; founrl in Art.
VII (C) ( 1) of the Charter.
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than to the state legislature. IllstRad of persuading us that
this is a case in which a state statute has imposed substantial
burdens on the Party's right to govem its affairs, appellants'
own statement of the facts establishes that it is the Party's
exercise of that very right that is the source of whatever
burdens they suffer. 1 5
The judgment of the Washington Supreme Court is affirmed.

Cousin.s v. W1goda. 419 U. S. 477, upon which a.ppellanti:i place their
primary reliance, does not Hllpport their claim here. In Cousins, unlike
thi~ ra::;e, there wa::; a :mb;;tantial burdrn on a~><oriationnl fr('Pdom~. Tlu~
fact alone rlistinguishe;; tlw two cmws, and renders Cou..~ins inappo~ite.
Moreover, in Cousins it wa::; empha::;ized that the Stat€' waH attempting to
regulate the National Party, who~e activities transcend the borders and
particular interc~t" of any ~ingle State. !d., at 409. Finally, Ill Cousins
there was no disJJute as to the right of the Democratic Part~· to decide
which delegatr~ should be permitted to participate: it wa.~ ron ceded by the
respondents there, and emJ)hasized in all of the opiuions, that '· ( t) he convention wa~ undrr no obligation to sl:'at " thr drlegation e]pcted in accordance with state law. !d., at 488; 491-492 (REHNQUIWJ', .T., concurring);
496 (PowELL, .T., concurring in part and diHsenting in part) . Here, on the
other hand, the Party's right to decide who may sit on the State Committee is the i~suc. The Washington Supreme Court hm: hrld that regardless of what the Part~· might wi~h, the Committee ma~' uot include any
members other than those specified b~· ~tatute. That i;; the law of the
State; the only frderal queHtion lH whether that law violates tlw Fir::>t
Amendment.
15
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